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ABSTRACT
There are many problems in people using Knowledge Management System (KMS) to share knowledge. We can classify these
problems into 3 types: 1) Free-riding situation, 2) Non-use situation, 3) Dormant situation. Organizations applied many
strategies (e.g. rewards) to encourage people to share knowledge, but there has been no conclusive evidence of the role of
them. This paper describes a research-in-progress that aims to 1) explain why and how the different knowledge sharing
problems occur in KMS, 2) promote a better understanding of the effect of rewards. By applying game-theoretical models to
analyze interactions between participants and doing case studies in KM projects of real organization, this research is expected
to contribute with new insights into managing knowledge sharing activities successfully.
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INTRODUCTION
Knowledge sharing (KS) activities can enable organizations to leverage their most valuable asset (Wasko and Faraj, 2000).
More and more organizations are using KMS to encourage people to share knowledge (Lawton, 2001). However, the
availability of ICT is no guarantee that KS will actually take place (Alavi and Leidner, 1999). Why people are reluctant to
share knowledge through KMS, and how to motivate them are still central problems in KS issues. This question has not yet
been fully answered is partly because many prior studies investigated the factors affecting KMS usage from a single
participant perspective (Kankanhalli, et al., 2005; Kollock, 1999; Markus, 2001; Wasko and Faraj, 2000). Few studies
focused on the interaction of participants in KS through KMS. In practice, however, people make KS decision based on
other’s activities.
This current study focuses on the interaction of participants in KMS. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
three types of knowledge sharing dilemmas. Section 3 summarizes studies about the role of rewards as motivation. Section 4
describes relevant theory we adopted. Section 5 designs research models of knowledge sharing and develops some
propositions.  In the end, we present the plan of case study in Kingdee International Software Group Company, Ltd. for
providing the evidence to propositions of theoretical model.
THREE TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING DILEMMAS
We consider the asynchronous model of knowledge sharing. There are 2 behaviors in knowledge sharing of KMS,
contributing knowledge and using knowledge (Goodman and Darr, 1998). Participants should make 2 decisions, 1)
contributing knowledge or not, 2) using others’ contribution or not. The process of knowledge sharing is described in figure 1:
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In this process, if participants choose “No” in some phases, several “knowledge sharing dilemmas” may occur (Cabrera and
Cabrera, 2002). We designed a 2 by 2 matrix, where the two decisions are the axes (Contribute - yes or no and adopt - yes or
no). Quadrant I is the perfect situation, where all participants contribute knowledge and use it. The other 3 quadrants can be
described as 3 dominant types of knowledge sharing dilemmas.
Figure 2. Knowledge sharing dilemmas in KMS
1. Free-riding problem (Quadrant II): Free-riding is one of the most serious problems in knowledge sharing (Kwok and Gao,
2004). Some participants use the knowledge in systems but are reluctant to share new knowledge. These problems even occur
in some famous systems such as Gnutella. Free-riding can make service unattractive and diminish system performance (Adar
and Huberman, 2000). It is not the perfect situation.
2. Dormant situation (Quadrant III):  No visitors contribute their knowledge and no one will use it. There are some reasons
for dormant situation: a) People cannot see a personal benefit from contribution; b) participants perceive insufficient support
from top management of organizations; c) KMS requires too much time and effort to contribute knowledge (Cabrera and
Cabrera, 2002). In this situation, people are reluctant to contribute and use knowledge, and thus systems are not being used.
3. Non-use problem (Quadrant IV): Although knowledge is contributed into the KMS, most participants will “reinvent the
wheel” rather than reuse organizational knowledge. In this way, participants do not improve their performance by benefiting
from the knowledge of others, while contributors have no motivation to upload their knowledge in the future (Garud and
Kumaraswamy, 2005). Non-use problems may not stay in KMS for a long time. In our paper, however, these problems will
be misleading reward Nash-equilibriums.
REWARD AS INCENTIVE
Many researchers have explored economic and social incentives to motivate participants to share knowledge in the context of
KMS  (Ba,  et  al.,  2001).  Reward  is  a  direct  incentive  strategy.  Many  studies  focus  on  the  role  of  systems  for  motivating
knowledge sharing behavior. However, there has been no conclusive evidence of the role of reward in the literature:
1. Some studies claim that reward systems are useful and important for most mechanisms of knowledge sharing (Bartol and
Srivastava, 2002; Orlikowski, 1993), and that it is a good investment for organizations (Bartol and Srivastava, 2002).
Kankanhalli and Tan (2005) found that rewards can motivate individuals to seek knowledge from EKR, especially in low
tacit knowledge tasks.
2. Other studies, however, have found that using rewards is not as universally effective as expected. Moon and Park (2002)
investigated the reward systems at Samsung. They found that reward systems could indeed motivate people to contribute
knowledge, but there were also many problems such as the lack of quality assurance of knowledge.
3. There are even studies that claim that reward systems have a negative effect. Bock and Kim (2002) found the expected
rewards discouraged the positive attitude toward knowledge sharing. Bock et al. (2005) also found that extrinsic rewards
sometimes negatively influenced attitudes toward knowledge sharing.
These studies have focused on the effect of incentives on the single decision-maker’s interaction with knowledge sharing
systems. There is, however, no discussion about how one user’s behavior impacts on another’s, or how one user can “cheat”
the system with misleading strategies. In the latter section of this paper, we describe our game-theoretical model and
investigate the role of rewards in motivating people to contribute knowledge.
Usage
Contribution
IV. Non-use Problem I. Perfect Situation
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RELEVANT THEORY
Social Exchange Theory
SET posits that when people share knowledge, they will maximize their benefits and minimize their costs (Molm, 1997).
Knowledge sharing in the context of KMS can be seen as the process of social exchange (Kankanhalli, et al., 2005). The
costs of contributing knowledge include: 1) time cost, 2) loss of power (Goodman and Darr, 1998). The benefits include: 1)
Reciprocal benefits, and 2) enjoyment in helping others (Kankanhalli, et al., 2005), 3) self-efficacy (Cabrera and Cabrera,
2002). The cost of using knowledge from EKR involves the time cost on seeking and matching knowledge (Goodman and
Darr, 1998); the benefits relate to users gaining new knowledge from it. Some factors (e.g. Knowledge reciprocity) are
affected by the interaction of people.
Game Theory
Game theory is the study of the interactions among rational players to produce outcomes with respect to the utilities of those
players (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Based on game theory, payoff function of each participant is determined by others’
behavior. We construct payoff function by cost and benefit factors of knowledge sharing, so the payoff function is also
determined by the interaction of people’s behavior. For example, P1 contribute knowledge at the beginning; if P1 know P2
will use it, P1 will obtain the enjoyment of helping, P2 will gain the knowledge; if  P2 do not use the knowledge, P2 will save
the using cost, however, motivation of P1 may be reduced. Participants will choose the behavior by which they can maximize
their utility. We can use the backward induction to analyze these complex balancing processes, and then have the condition
of possible Nash equilibrium.
GAME THEORECTICAL MODELS
In this section, we simply introduce two knowledge sharing models based on game theory. Considering the limitation of
length, we just describe the extensive form and major propositions, additional detail will be provided upon request.
Simple Model: Contribution Or No Contribution
We first consider a situation in which the quality of knowledge can be easily identified. Participants can only make the choice
of contribution or no contribution. This situation is not very common in knowledge sharing; however, knowledge sharing in
low tacit tasks (e.g. data sharing and secondary materials sharing) can be explained as examples. Simple model is a 4 phase
game-theoretical framework. The extensive-form is:
Figure 3. The extensive-form of simple model
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Proposition 1: (Possible Nash-equilibriums)
There are 4 possible Nash-equilibriums at the end of the game: Perfect situation (S1), Free-riding problem (S3), Non-use
problem (S6) and Dormant situation (S9). (Proof can be provided upon request)
We use reward as the motivator of people’s contribution. We assume that reward is associated with one’s added knowledge
contribution, and ( ) 0r r k= ≥ .
Proposition 2: (Adding Reward)
If the reward is sufficiently high, it can effectively motivate people to share knowledge in the EKR. There are 2 possible
equilibriums, S1 and S5. (Proof can be provided upon request)
Corollary 2.1:  If the timing cost of using knowledge from EKR is low enough, the Perfect situation (S1) is the unique Nash
equilibrium. (Proof can be provided upon request)
Complex Model: Contribution Of High Or Low Quality Knowledge
Let us consider more complex and “real” situation where the quality of knowledge cannot be easily identified. Participants
can choose to contribute high or low quality knowledge, or not to contribute. The total energy and time of each participant
are limited; every contributor should balance the quantity and quality of knowledge.  The complex model is also 4-phase
game. P1 can make one choice from “CH, CL or N (No contribution)” and choose the quantity of contribution. In the second
phase, P2 chooses whether to use or not to use knowledge from the system. In the third phase, he chooses the strategy from
“CH,  CL  or  N”  and  the  quantity  of  contribution.  P1  ends  the  game  with  choosing  whether  to  use  or  not  to  use  this  new
knowledge.  The extensive form is:
Figure 4. The extensive-form game in complex model
Proposition 3: (Possible Nash-equilibriums)
There are more complex situations and more possible Nash-equilibriums than the simple model. They involve the Perfect
situation (S1), the Free-riding problem (S5, S15, S21, S23), the Non-use problem (S10, S20), and the Dormant situation
(S25). (Proof can be provided upon request)
If an organization can not distinguish between different qualities of knowledge contributions, it can only give reward
assuming that high quality knowledge has been contributed. When the participants contribute one report of their knowledge,
the reward is ( )hr r k= , the total reward of participant a  is ( )a hR Nr k= . N is the number of reports.
Proposition 4: (Add Reward)
When the reward is sufficiently high, it misleads participants to an ineffective situation-S19, which is unique Nash-
equilibrium and the participants contribute a considerable quantity of low quality knowledge but do not use knowledge from
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Proposition 4 can be explained as the “misleading reward”, reward is so attractive that participants find they can gain more
without needing to work hard. Thus, they will “reinvent low quality wheels.” This is an interesting result where active
contributors may cheat the system with low quality knowledge. If there had been no misleading reward, they might have
contributed their new idea. In this situation, the reward will motivate people to maximize their private utility, but the outcome
is ineffective. Some studies can provide the evidence of this proposition. Garud and Kumaraswamy (2005) investigated the
KM projects of Infosys (one of biggest software companies in India), and described the vicious circle of reward.
STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING
In knowledge sharing, not only the quantity but also quality of knowledge is important. We can apply some strategies to
protect the quality of knowledge in contribution:
1. We consider adding a review process. If we can identify the quality of knowledge, we will give different levels of reward
to contributors based on quality, ( )h hr r k= , ( )l lr r k= . It is easily proved by game theory that contributing low quality
knowledge is not the Nash-equilibrium. In practice, there are two major review strategies: 1) employing “knowledge
steward” to manage KMS, 2) “voting”, knowledge users can vote on the knowledge which is useful to them. Based on
theory, these strategies can solve the problems of quality. However, there are some potential problems in applying them
(e.g. users may not be motivated to vote).
2. Creating a knowledge sharing culture. Many studies investigate the culture influence on knowledge sharing, and the
importance of creating knowledge sharing culture in facilitating high quality sharing(Goodman and Darr, 1998; Muller,
et al., 2005) .
INVESTIGATATION IN REAL ORGANIZATION: CASE STUDY IN KINGDEE
Background of Kingdee Software Company
Kingdee International Software Group Company, Ltd. (www.kingdee.com) was founded in 1993, headquartered in Shenzhen,
P.R.China. It is a leading ERP software supplier and application solution provider in the Asia-Pacific region and the
undisputed leader in the Chinese software market.  It is also one of the fastest-growing independent software vendors in the
global market, and listed on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (HKSE) in 2005. Kingdee set up
3 R&D centers in Shenzhen and Shanghai, and has 39 branches that are primarily responsible for selling and servicing
customers. At present, Kingdee has 3200 employees and over 400,000 customers in whole Asian-Pacific region, including
Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.
Kingdee has its unique organizational culture. Its management mode is “Passionate Management”. The company inputs a
passion for the knowledge workers and provides them with sufficient capacity and platform. Kingdee have applied KM
projects to help knowledge workers for several years and have set up series of KMS.  KM projects include department of KM
(Kcentral), OA and a big KM portal-Mykingdee (www.mykingdee.com). Only employees of Kingdee can access
“Mykingdee” to share knowledge and search useful documents. “Kcentral” manages KM initiatives and also has an incentive
plan for facilitating knowledge sharing through “Mykingdee”.
Research Approaches
Case study is most suitable for research issues at early stage of formulation (Sherif and Vinze, 2003). We propose to do some
semi-structure interviews in Kingdee. Through the case study of KM projects in Kingdee, we can: 1) providing the real
evidence of propositions, analyzing the implication and limitation of research model; 2) considering more complex factors,
such as culture and IT, to find the effective ways to facilitate knowledge sharing.
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Figure 5. Proposed research framework
EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION
The mix of game theoretic approaches coupled with empirical studies may promise a higher level of understanding of KS
issues with implications for both research and practice. This study is expected to find some strategies which can motivate
people to sharing knowledge effectively.
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